

原子力供給国グループ(NSG)の対インド核関連輸出解禁決定に関する

平和市長会議声明

(日本語要約、原文は英語)

9月6日、原子力供給国グループ(NSG)の臨時総会において、インドへの米国の原子力協力を可能とするためのガイドラインの改定が承認された。これは核不拡散条約(NPT)体制の形骸化をもたらすものであり、今後の核兵器廃絶の取組みを進める上での大きな支障となることは明白である。我々は、NSG加盟国のうち1か国でもNPT体制の維持のために立ち上がることを期待していたが、そうした行動をとる知恵や勇気のある国が一つもなかったことは、失望以外の何物でもない。

今回の決定は、NPT締約国全体の承認なしに行われただけでなく、締約国との正式な協議すらなされていない。インドとの核関連貿易に携わろうとするNPT締約国の行為は、同条約第1条に基づく義務(非核兵器国に対し核兵器取得を支援することの禁止)を尊重しない無謀なものであり、NSGが承認したからといって、そのような行為が合法化されるわけではない。2009年5月のNPT再検討会議準備委員会では、この問題が優先事項として協議されるべきであり、かかる協議の結果が公表されるまで、すべての国々はインドとの核関連取引を保留すべきである。

この度の決定はNPTの信頼性への危機を非常に深めることになったが、その根底には、核兵器廃絶のための誠実な交渉義務、すなわち国際司法裁判所により勧告された「全面的核軍縮につながる交渉を誠実にやり完了させる」義務を、一部の核兵器国が長く果たしてこなかったことが要因としてある。

広島・長崎両市が主宰する平和市長会議では、こうした危機を念頭に、本年4月、NPTを補完し2020年までの核兵器廃絶の道筋を示す「ヒロシマ・ナガサキ議定書」を発表した。今回のNSGの決定により、同議定書の必要性・妥当性はさらに高まっている。我々は各国政府に対し、2010年NPT再検討会議での同議定書の採択を早急に検討するよう働きかけを強めていきたい。



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MAYORS FOR PEACE STATEMENT ON THE N.S.G DECISION TO GRANT INDIA A WAIVER

On September 6th, 2008, a small, unrepresentative group of countries gave each other permission to violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group not only ignored the unanimous decision of the 1995 NPT Extension Conference, they ignored the NPT itself. The NPT, which has always been considered the cornerstone of the nuclear-nonproliferation regime, receives but a single perfunctory mention in their decision. This puts them in league with India, which has a long-standing record of disdain for the NPT, and the United States which, under the current Bush Administration, has also shown disdain for the Treaty. We had pinned our hopes on at least one member of the NSG opposing the changes and standing up for the integrity of the NPT. That none had the wisdom or courage to do so makes this a very sad day, indeed, for the NPT.

This action was not only taken without the permission or authorization of the NPT States Parties as a whole, but also without even consulting them. Indeed, at the most recent meeting of the States Parties (2008 Prep Com) principled objections to a waiver were raised by states not members of the NSG. These objections were completely ignored.

The 1995 NPT decision to bar trade with non-nuclear-weapon states that do not accept full-scope safeguards was taken for the expressed purpose of tightening compliance with Article I of the NPT, which prohibits assisting "in any way" the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear-weapon states. While India is a nuclear-armed state, under the terms of the NPT it is by definition a non-nuclear-weapon state since it had not conducted a nuclear explosion prior to conclusion of NPT negotiations (the actual cut-off date is 1 January 1967). Full-scope safeguard are the only means of having assurance that supplies, equipment, and information

regarding nuclear power generation and fuel enrichment and reprocessing is not contributing to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The NSG not only waived the full-scope safeguards requirement, they granted the waiver before seeing the Additional Protocol which India is to negotiate with the IAEA. If that Protocol Agreement is similar to the one the nuclear-weapon states have with the IAEA it will be useless for providing assurance against diversion of sensitive supplies, equipment, or information. Only an Additional Protocol of the type designed for non-nuclear-weapon states gives such assurances.

In short, any NPT State Party that now engages in nuclear trade with India is acting in reckless disregard for its obligations under Article I of the Treaty. The fact that an unauthorized group of countries have collectively agreed to accept such behavior does not make it legal.

Let us be clear, the effect of the decision taken in Vienna, intended or otherwise, is to recognize India as a sixth nuclear-weapon state. The NSG states have no right whatsoever to impose such a radical change on the rest of the world. Their decision has no legal standing, and cannot unless and until the NPT States Parties as a whole agree to give it such standing. The Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference should give priority consideration to this matter at its May 2009 meeting. Until the outcome of those consultations is known, all States must keep nuclear trade with India on hold.

This unauthorized decision only deepens the crisis in confidence surrounding the NPT. At the center of this vortex is the persistent avoidance by some of the nuclear-weapon states of their legal obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith on the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, or as the International Court of Justice put it: to conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. It was with this crisis in mind that the Cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with the backing of Mayors for Peace, issued the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol.

With the NSG decision of September 6th, the Protocol gains even greater relevance and we call on governments to begin consideration of it in the Preparatory Committee of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.