

The 6th General Conference of Mayors for Peace
Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Atomic Bombings

Keynote Speech
*Evaluating the 2005 NPT Review Conference and Prospect
for Nuclear Abolition*

15:45-17:00, Thursday, August 4, 2005
Phoenix Hall
International Conference Center Hiroshima

Keynote Speaker: **Kuniko Inoguchi**
Professor, Sophia University

Tadatoshi Akiba, Vice President of Mayors for Peace, Mayor, Hiroshima, Japan:

I would like to welcome all of you back to the conference hall and it is my pleasure to start this session. The keynote speaker of the 6th General Conference of the Mayors For Peace is Prof. Inoguchi. She is currently a Professor of Sophia University in Tokyo but her illustrious career is quite long. I'd like to introduce part of that to you briefly.

She received her Ph.D. in political science from Yale University, and from April 2002 to April 2004 she was appointed as Permanent Representative and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland. So this is the Japanese Ambassador of Disarmament in Geneva. And her publications include *War and Peace*, this is not a novel but a scholarly treatise, and also *An Emerging Post-Hegemonic System: Choices for Japan, Invitation to Political Science* and academic articles published in various journals.

Previously, I mentioned her in connection with democratizing the United Nations and she will, I'm sure, mention her work in the United Nations that while she was the Ambassador to the United Nations she actually showed to the world what an excellent academician could do in politics and in diplomacy by implementing measures which restrict effectively the small arms trade within the world, among other things. So without further adieu, I'd like to invite Prof. Kuniko Inoguchi of Sophia University. Prof. Inoguchi, please.

Kuniko Inoguchi, Professor, Sophia University: Thank you very much indeed, Mayor Akiba. You are very kind, too kind. Thank you very much. So Mayor Akiba, Your Excellencies, and distinguished mayors from all around the world, and ladies and gentlemen, and also colleagues, it is indeed my very, very great pleasure to be here to participate in this very important and inspiring conference.

And first of all, I would like to congratulate the organizers of this conference and all the Mayors for Peace and all of those who support those mayors in such a dynamic and significant effort of a transnational nature.

I also would like to congratulate very strongly and personally Mayor Akiba and also Mayor Itoh for their unflinching and untiring effort to uphold the profound message of hibakusha and their children and grandchildren and the rest of the citizens of those two cities. And the message is that, as was pointed out by Ambassador Roche, the sufferings they had gone through should never be repeated by anybody anywhere in the world. Their continuous commitment, as represented by the energetic campaigns and work of those two mayors is a kind of light or a ray of light or ray of hope in dark waters of difficulties and political stalemates, about which we are all very much frustrated. So I would like to wholeheartedly congratulate the very successful effort of this campaign and wish you all the best, and of course you have all my support, maximum of my support.

Now the task assigned to me this afternoon is to evaluate the 2005 NPT Conference and discuss prospects for nuclear abolition, but in order to do that let us first of all try to think and keep in mind the emerging features of the new multilateralism or new internationalization, and it is my understanding that our effort towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons needs to be placed within the new features of the new

internationalization, which together has reduced, and some signs of that are already with us. So let us capitalize on those new trends and place disarmament efforts within that context.

So let us spend just a few minutes to see and think together, what are the new features of the new multilateralism as opposed to new conservatism? So here is the other conceptual dimension, an alternative to the prevailing view of new conservatism, so a new multilateralism, new international relations in the 21st century. What are the components and how can we relate the nuclear disarmament area to those new features?

First of all, I pointed out the past knowledge. So many of the global issues today have become increasingly more complex, that experts or a coalition of experts and practitioners must create successful networks to deepen their knowledge and to show in a knowledge-based effort the path to the future. Now in the past, if we think back, what were the components of international relations that forced other countries to think which otherwise they wouldn't have thought. In the 19th century, probably the coercive labor power. In the 20th century, it could have been the economic power. But in the 21st century, you cannot threaten other states to make them do things that otherwise they would not do. You neither can persuade other countries with economic power. In the 21st century it is most likely that changes will come along those that profess excessive knowledge and can show knowledge-based ways to achieve these goals.

Now the labor power rests with States. Economic power rests with States and business enterprises, but the knowledge of power rests with each individual human existence, so in the end a State will have to look into the civil society and each expert, each activist, each campaigner, and of course the mayors of local government who possess very important pieces of local knowledge, as well as ways to relate them to a universal message, full ideas as to how to overcome global bottlenecks. So the power of knowledge is what I would consider to be one of the very important features of the coming age, and here I think we should have, in the former part I said, a network of scholars, scientists, professionals, NGOs, citizens, mayors, practitioners, policy-makers, those who share knowledge and a problem-solving mindset. And it's called an epistemic community, it comes from the philosophy, the vocabulary of philosophy of epistemology. It's the community of knowledge but not in the sense contained within the knowledge community only, but with the problem-solving mindset to utilize knowledge to overcome the world's problems. So the power of knowledge is one of the major elements of the new multilateralism which we wish to have and in which future nuclear disarmament efforts should be placed.

The second important feature is the priority on human time and progress. Now of course in the nuclear disarmament area, listening to hibakusha and what they have to tell us is the single-most important driving force to force us to think, what are the humanitarian goals of nuclear disarmament? I know in this issue we can learn a lot from other areas of government, as was introduced by Mayor Akiba, from the kind of objectives which were done in conventional weapons including anti-personnel landmines, ICBLs. We have Dr. Susan Walker represented in this room. We can learn from the efforts of humanitarian de-mining, on the importance of prioritizing

humanitarian progress, so that we will be able to make common ground to bring safe together to pursue the kinds of legal arrangements that they are responsible for doing.

And as I said when I tried to make the point for the power of knowledge, the third, got enhanced partnerships, is the key point. I called it a "new triad for making a difference": States, international organizations and civil society must come together. And it is very indicative that in this room we have representatives and the Under-Secretary-General Mr. Ambassador Abe, and also I hope some governments are interested in our activities and we have this wide range of representation from civil society, NGOs, local governments and citizens and just the citizens. What we need is an enhanced partnership. And this is from NPT 2005, it will tell us what we need to do to enhance that partnership so that States will not make similar failures in the future.

Now the next feature is the implementation of norms and rules, and the norms and rules are there but those are not implemented. The 20th century was very much into this, creating norms and rules, but was not very capable of implementing them. And as we implement norms and rules, it is very important to do that in an integrated manner at all different level: global, regional, national and local. At the global level there is this United Nations effort for nuclear disarmament, also, as Ambassador Akiba kindly pointed out, all kinds of efforts at the conventional weapons level as well. In the nuclear disarmament area, we have adopted numerous General Assembly resolutions and there are many resolutions, and tricky resolutions, associated with treaties. At the regional level we could have more of a common denominator and therefore we may be able to push the process even farther beyond what is acceptable at the global level. At the global level, sometimes it tends to become a minimum common denominator, whereas, at the regional level one could step forward further due to common understanding about the common States in the same region. You could have, you could carry on campaigns at the regional levels, in the Asia-Pacific, in Europe, and of course nuclear-free zone activities and efforts belong to very successful ways of consolidating regional commitments to that end.

And of course States, the primary bearer of responsibility in this regard, States must put in place the necessary legislation according to the treaty commitments they have made at the global level. Also, States are responsible for putting on the agenda, at the global level, of the priorities for the human society. But then, the local government level or the local citizens level is the key to the real implementation and real understanding and deep support for what national governments should be doing at the global level as they represent States.

So coordination of all these four levels is very important. And we can look at examples from the conventional weapons area. In small arms, we have the United Nations forces to the program of action, we even don't have a treaty, so nuclear disarmament is far ahead of us. But still the implementation efforts in small arms or the anti-personnel landmines area is very vigorous and regional platforms also serve as a very important implementation focal arena. And nation states' governments are asked to put in place administrative and legislative measures to make sure the treaty commitments or political commitments will be carried out. And the real de-mining or collection and destruction of small arms and the like takes place at the local level. And also the real education and disarmament takes us to the local level. And the real

voice of the affected, the local knowledge, is mobilized at the local level. All knowledge starts with local knowledge. And among all local knowledge, what is locally known by the affected population is something that everybody else must learn from.

So this brings us to the next bullet point, mobilizing local knowledge for global solutions. And here the hibakusha knowledge needs to be shared more systematically and widely. And I appreciate the kind of statement made earlier by Ambassador Roche focusing on the importance of focusing on hibakusha. And we now have, as I said, the second generation, third generation of people who lived through, survived, and are trying to send an inter-generational message to us.

And the next bullet, the results-oriented mindset. We are here not only to extend words but to make sure that something could happen, "make a difference" needs to be the keyword. Since we've said, the second bullet, we are prioritizing humanitarian progress, that means something that affects each human beings and human security, results are very important. You need to even take more acute effort, understanding of the need for the result-oriented mindset.

For the last point, inclusion, I call it the "philosophy of inclusion," under democracy everybody is equal, but then even if you are equal you may not be included in the network. In the United Nations, for example, this is a little bit different area, but adjacent to disarmament in the development area these days, for example, poverty is conceptualized not only as a category of income but as exclusion. No matter how much income you could increase under certain policy measures, if certain parts of the population, such as women or such as minorities or in other criteria, are excluded, the poverty is wisdom. So inclusion is the keyword. It doesn't necessarily mean that every decision needs to be on a consensus basis, as was indicated earlier, but we have to always be mindful of the fact that weapons affect every nation and every human community, and therefore, in the end we have to make maximum effort to develop the sense of ownership to the process on the part of all States and all actors, including NGOs, international organizations, citizens' activities, local governments. So everybody is the partner and owner of the process, and therefore they have to be responsible and they have to make due contributions to push the process forward with a results-oriented mindset.

So against these new elements, how was the NPT Review Conference? And we really should be very shameful of what really the main conference produced in the light of some of the new trends that are emerging in some other areas. Now let us, since this is a task assigned to me, I hope you would not mind reading with me what I have to say about the outcome of the Review Conference 2005.

Now it was attended by 153 countries. They failed to build on the past agreement, and on any kind of decisions or recommendations for furthering progress on the vital security issues of nuclear non-proliferation, so some see it as a total failure. And the conference, as everybody knows, lasted for four weeks, and four weeks is a long, long time. When I had to promote the small arms and light weapons processes at the United Nations I had one week, but then the lead-up to that was as important as one week of conference. But the NPT had four weeks! And they had three years of lead-up, and it failed. And instead of utilizing their four weeks and resources to tackle

vital challenges and debate practical ideas for implementing, because implementation is the key. Later I will be discussing the need for a new treaty beyond NPT, but before getting there we have to implement NPT, and implementation, as I said, has always been lacking during the 20th century. We were very good at writing down something, drafting, but not at implementation for the reasons that, as I've shown earlier, the coordination between all four levels didn't function.

So we could have, during the four weeks, or they could have, I was not in the government any more, debated practical ideas for implementing the treaty's commitment more effectively. The government delegations tangled themselves with procedures and lost a lot of time. It was a lot of time spent in procedural issues. On the final day they agreed to a procedural document that numbers of participants in meetings and indicated how they could cover the financial cost. So that is my evaluation of this NPT 2005 conference.

Now what could have been done? I am fully aware of the enormous difficulties and political difficulties and circumstances, but despite that, it should still have been possible to use the conference to give a strong message at least, *at least* about the importance of preventing the use, acquisition and spread of nuclear weapons. At least, when I said at least I didn't write down the ban of production. At least they could have agreed on those messages, and nuclear weapons, and also nuclear materials, of course, and possibly delivery means of nuclear weapons, and in failing to address these issues seriously or send any kind of principled message, you see? Those conferences are to produce a principled message agreed among governments. The governments have the trades' aspirations and security interests of their citizens from around the world.

But many parties felt something, and most parties, I would assume, would agree on those points. There are a few that may not agree, but during those four weeks, those were the points which most parties felt were important. All right? First now, we find it quite important, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are not two very separate things. The States tends to be more interested in non-proliferation issues because of this understanding of this perception of new threats, the terrorist threat, and in order to deal with terrorist threats you have to have very strong non-proliferation policies, and that means a lot attention and also support, but what is important is, nuclear non-proliferation is unsustainable without significant progress in nuclear disarmament.

Now this is because, among many other reasons, it's very simple. Now, if you want to minimize the probability of nuclear terrorism, how should we go about thinking on non-proliferation and disarmament issues? Nuclear terrorism could occur by nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. When do such circumstances arrive? Other things being equal, if you have a larger quantity of anything, the probability of slipping away from your stockpiles or arsenals is larger. So if you want to minimize or reduce the risk of proliferation, you need to reduce the active quantity of the thing, of the good, weapon, that you don't want to leak out.

So non-proliferation in fact is a first step towards anti-terrorist strategy. In order to stem terrorism, and in fact I did cite that, you have to understand the nature of the conflict and you have to go for reconciliation, but then you don't have reconciliation

with the maximum amount of weapons in hand and also you don't reduce the risk of proliferation if you keep on increasing the upset quantity of the weapon. So the first bullet, non-proliferation is unsustainable without significant progress in nuclear disarmament. That was what most parties felt in my understanding.

Now the second point is about the disguise of proliferation under the cover of peaceful use. That needs to be discussed and addressed more intensively. So the second point goes, the nuclear fuel cycle is now a bigger security problem than recognized when the treaty entered into force in the 1970s and therefore will have to be addressed. And it was a pity that the May conference failed to address this to the full extent given the enormous amount of time which was available.

Later, I have made this slide for you, some of the ideas about how to go about the nuclear fuel cycle. These are the discussions that could have taken place if delegations of State were serious enough to use the United Nations conference rooms and the treaty body itself to discuss some important issues, new issues, that have future implications.

Now there are other points I probably have left. In importance, the third point could be less important, but nevertheless I may have to point it out. We all know that NPT functions and also the Conference on Disarmament and many other bodies function on a group system basis, and the group based on the Western group and others, New York and the Eastern European, oh, I didn't mean to say, that's all. I mean, many East European countries are in New York, so other East European countries and the non-aligned movement is outdated, so they have to revise the group system and that was felt strongly by many participants or parties to that conference.

Now the fourth bullet is relatively important or very important. In view of the failure of the 2005 Review Conference, the agreements obtained in the Review Conferences of 1995 and 2000 still stand as legal and political benchmarks for measuring progress and promoting compliance until the NPT can be fully implemented in all its nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation aspects. So what was achieved in 1995 and 2000 in particular, when there was an unequivocal commitment by nuclear weapons States to agree on certain important points, that stands still as the legal commitment and political benchmarks.

So the problems of the 2005 conference neither invalidate nor undermine the relevant obligations and undertakings previously agreed to, and therefore, since the conference this year did not produce documents that would guide us to implementation, we have to find the guidance in previous documents.

The next bullet is something very, very important. Now during the NPT conference, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led a movement, and during the conference, but also in the lead-up, so led the movement to the 2005 Review Conference, and now that needs to be built on and that needs to be given the right coherent strategy. We have to strategize what was achieved by those two mayors in the lead-up to the 2005 conference and during the 2005 conference. The world mayors and governors together with parliamentarians must create a strategic partnership. Now this is what I called "an enhanced partnership" as one of the characteristics of the new

multilateralism. We need a strategic partnership between government, civil society, government and civil society, including local government.

And then I have a rather important line. Local knowledge, as I've said, of survivors, an affected population. And in the nuclear disarmament context this is hibakusha, and second generation hibakusha, and third generation hibakusha. They must be put to use to create common bases for global solutions. We have to encourage them to raise voices and in this campaign to raise a voice we can learn from ICBL, in anti-personnel landmines. And also we learned a lot as we enhance the United Nations process on small arms and light weapons, learn from what was done with anti-personnel mines regarding the affected. Incidentally, I was the co-chair for the Anti-Mining Standing Committee for the Ottawa Treaty as well. What we tried to do is really to encourage survivors to raise their voices, and when they raise their voice, the delegates of States must listen carefully and with respect because those are the people who have gone through and survived such a tremendous challenge.

So Mayor Akiba and Mayor Itoh were very effective and instrumental in pushing this campaign to make sure that voices from the two cities are heard on the global level.

Now the last point I have to make as a professor -- which is rather unfortunate because we think that what we should hope is that our generation will be able to tackle all the problems and therefore there is no need for disarmament education for the future generation, but it doesn't go that way -- outreach to generations to come is a must since nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation requires long-term commitment and obligations and also implementation is far from complete. So the goal of disarmament education is to prioritize, to enhance inter-generational partnerships to carry on the process.

So in my view, those are some of the few points which most States felt were understood during the four weeks of deliberations. However, we have to think beyond, we have to really think beyond. We need a treaty that takes us beyond NPT. We have to keep the NPT, we have to implement it to the full extent, but what we need to look into now is the next generation of nuclear disarmament treaty. And it is essentially a ban on the future production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

Now the future production of fissile materials, weapons grade fissile material, is, I would say, is a kind of raw material for something you manufacture. So if you don't have the raw material, you will not be able to produce the final product. So FMCT, to some material, a kind of treaty, is a kind of treaty that ultimately prohibits any production of any nuclear weapons in any part of the world. The single most important feature of this treaty is that it does not have a discriminative nature. As you know, NPT distinguishes two categories of States, those that exploded a nuclear device before January 1, 1967, and those who didn't. Now this fissile material sort of treaty prohibits the production of fissile material, weapons grade, for all States, so there is one category of States and members, parties, if this treaty is adopted. And therefore, nuclear weapons States under NPT will also agree not to produce any further nuclear weapons.

If you allow me, this was one of the issues which absorbed most of my energy during my ambassadorship in Geneva. Essentially my job was to convince each nuclear

weapons State to agree to entering into the negotiation of this treaty. And the disarmament treaty, once it is put to a legal negotiation process, it usually comes out with a product. So what States do is to deter the entry into the negotiation and nuclear weapons States have very strong reasons not to let this negotiation process progress forward. But some things do change, whereas many things don't change.

What I found, with some limited encouragement, is that in the end, for example, the United States also said yes to this concept of treaty throughout the NPT in May, the NPT conference in May. It is my understanding because I was not there, but the United States insisted that FMCT is a must and it is necessary, and part of the argument which we said, which I've said with them, is that, as I said, as I discussed anti-terrorist strategies, the most important anti-terrorist strategy is to make every country agree, and every country will not agree unless the United States agrees that no country will produce any further nuclear weapons, because if you keep increasing the absolute quantity then the probability of getting into the wrong hands is bigger, so if you want to fight terrorism you have to have NPT. This will ban production of nuclear weapons.

So under NPT, Article VI, as Ambassador Roche explained, we have to dismantle the existing weapons, but then there is no treaty to prohibit future production of nuclear weapons. So this is the next nuclear disarmament treaty after NPT, and after entering into force of the CTBT, but we can do that on parallel, there's nothing that hinders us from getting into negotiations of this FMCT and therefore effort in Geneva is expected. And I would like to take this opportunity to ask the Mayors for Peace and all other associated NGOs and citizens to put all out pressure to governments to get down with this FMCT negotiation because most nuclear weapons States, including the United States, have accepted the prospect for this treaty now.

Now I have written down the basis for legitimacy. First of all, in the NPT context, as we had the 1995 extension conference, the review and extension conference, the call for the FMCT was included as immediate, it was included, not only included but it called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiation on the FMCT. It was a part of a political bargain and it was never denied explicitly and therefore there is full legitimate reasons for the need of going to this next generation nuclear disarmament treaty.

Now if you're interested in the elements of this treaty, I have a website in fact. It was Sophia University's website, and I have drafted a lot of recommends and also the framework for negotiations. I have it on my website. I'm sure it's with the website of the Conference on Disarmament also, so please look at it and share with me the understanding that we need the next nuclear disarmament treaty; we need a legally binding treaty that takes us beyond NPT to make sure that any further production of nuclear weapons is banned in the entire global community.

The second bullet shows that in the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which was five years ago, which was not all that unsuccessful, in fact it was quite successful given that the Review Conference this time was totally unsuccessful. In the 2000 NPT, the parties successfully drafted a final document, and in the final document it included this call for the immediate commencement and negotiation of FMCT. This has to do with CD and agree on the work, but that's a technicality so you don't have to pay

attention to that, but what was important is that in the 2000 NPT it was also again included in the final document, so there is all legitimate legal basis to identify FMCT as the next treaty in line. And also since 2000, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted annually, by consensus, the resolution on FMCT. So those are the bases on which we insist that we have to look to treaties beyond NPT.

And of course NPT does not enjoy full universalization due to India, Pakistan and Israel. So FMCT, since there's no discriminative clause, there is no reason for any country not to come into FMCT.

Now, those are rather technical notes so you really don't have to look to the first bullet point, but this Ambassador Shannon is a Canadian ambassador who in 1995 made a major effort forward to put this agenda under an international forum, and so we owe a lot to the late Ambassador Shannon, and still today the Shannon Mandate tells us what the FMCT is about. And it is on the Second Lagos Ban of the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices.

And the last line, the second from the last line, is also very important. To negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effective and verifiable treaty. So this is called the Shannon Mandate along which we understand how the FMCT would look like. And of course there are many elements within this context that need to be discussed.

Now the third bullet point is, let's see, well I think we can go to the next one. The technical deliberations. Now let me take this opportunity to share with you some of the technical side of this FMCT to show what is to be expected beyond NPT and to strengthen NPT.

Now the first goes, substantial technical deliberations will be required to achieve this objective without affecting the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. So the right to the fissile use of nuclear energy is guaranteed under the NPT, so this will not be jeopardized and to make that sure the technical deliberations could be quite extensive and rather difficult.

Now States need to define the scope of materials to be placed under monitoring and elaborate the verification schemes and to ensure the sufficient credibility to the treaty, and the materials to be monitored. So those are very familiar to many of you, of course the plutonium and hydrogen-enriched uranium and 235 isotopes, if it's enriched to 20 per cent can be used for weapons and this is the benchmark used by IAEA to safeguard also. So those materials are within the scope of FMCT.

And for the plutonium, there are two different views, one is if the plutonium is produced by irradiation in the reactive core, that plutonium needs to be subjected to monitoring. The other idea is that if it is only separated from irradiated reactive fuel, then it needs to be monitored. But in any case, this is for the weapons grade and for the weapons, so how to make it compatible to peaceful use is a kind of very difficult technical issue, as I've said earlier, in relation to the proliferation under the disguise of peaceful use.

And of course there are what we call ANMs, alternative nuclear materials, and many other isotopes that need to be covered within the FMCT. And once, as I've said, those materials for weapons are totally banned from production, you will not be able to make a nuclear weapon. And therefore, to think of that in Hiroshima, of the day when no other nuclear weapon will be made anywhere in the world, is something that we should look into and hope for.

So the verification is also a very technical but also a very contested part of this argument so I might share some major points that they often discuss. The verification regime needs to be composed of three elements: the declaration of fissile materials in facilities by member states; the verification of declared material, and; the verification of undeclared material and activities. This is very much in line with NPT. And then I drew some generic parameters from the arms control verification regimes that already exist today. So those are the things that we need to negotiate and put into the treaty format, and in fact, when I say knowledge-based consultations or knowledge, the power of knowledge, it is expected that civil society, the experts, scientists, scholars, think tanks, activists, would come together to draw this kind of treaty together.

And I would very much hope that future activities of Hiroshima are, first of all, we have to consolidate the raise voice campaign for hibakusha. But for the scholars it is very important to draft treaties for the practitioners because they need models to proceed with to imagine how the ultimate end product would look. And such effort is not all that coming at least from Japan. A few European NGOs have helped me a lot with the drafting of the framework for FMCT, but in future we need the power of knowledge to install new nuclear disarmament treaties, and for that we need many alternative treaties, models, and that can come from citizens, from civil society.

Now some of the general parameters for the verification, because verification is a very sensitive part of the entire framework of this new treaty, how to ensure the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration. That sounds very much like IAEA. How to guarantee, sufficient assurances from routine inspections, how to detect and declare activities and issue effectiveness at least of the inspections. I mean, what if some other countries have clandestine activities to produce such weapons grade materials. How to protect sensitive, confidential information, the framework of verification. So in the transition, nuclear weapons States will have the nuclear weapons that already exist. So they will have confidential information, but on the other hand they will be committing to no further production, future production, so they need to be put under some kind of verification, but the No. 4 point encompasses the difficulty associated with this, how to protect the sensitive and confidential information for those States that need to be protected under NPT.

Now how to ensure cost effectiveness and cost efficiency. Verification is always very costly, but of course, if you think of the cost of wars or WMD wars, we should not be scared away with the budget consideration.

Now the last, how to create a verification system that can respond flexibly to technological progress. Now there are many non-intrusive verification technologies these days, remote sensing or monitoring, and while the FMCT entering into negotiation is pending, technological progress could provide us with a lot of non-

intrusive monitoring and verification technologies and that will make this FMCT verification component a little easier to negotiate.

And of course the non-nuclear weapons States of NPT, like Japan, which have accepted both IAEA full scope safeguards and additional protocols are considered to meet FMCT verification requirements. So it is expected that all countries or all non-nuclear weapons States who are pending the negotiation for FMCT will accept full scope safeguards and additional protocols so that once we have FMCT, non-nuclear weapons States will not have to worry about any further.

Now this is a kind of new issue which I sort of hinted earlier. Now there is this very big problem that the world needs a lot of energy and there is this worldwide demand for nuclear energy. Now why is that? Now why is that? Growing global demand for electricity. Many countries are successfully growing, although the human community as a whole hasn't very successfully developed in a sustainable manner of development, and therefore global demand for electricity is soaring and uncertainty of supply and price of natural gas and soaring prices of oil, of course, concerns about air pollution and the immense challenge of lowering the greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol and so forth. So now these have come to justify the growing demand for nuclear energy.

Of course, as the technical and organization foundation for nuclear safety improves, the prospect of new nuclear power stations on a large scale is a real one. So in future we have to agree to the scenario whereby a lot of countries will resort to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but at the same time, how could we guarantee their right to use nuclear energy but make sure that the process will not occur? So that's a challenge and there is no answer. So this is not an answer. This is just sitting out of the agenda of the problem, the new kind of problem which should have been discussed within the NPT conference.

Now could we allow a great number of States to develop their own nuclear fuel cycles? And the answer is probably not, considering the non-proliferation advantage. So there is this report which just came out, actually it came out right before the NPT May conference from IAEA, there was an expert group for the Director-General of IAEA, and they produced a concept paper entitled "Multilateral Nuclear Approach" and the report number is 640 so you might be able to have access to it through the IAEA website.

Now it suggests multiple options for avoiding unlimited development of sovereign nuclear fuel cycles by developing some kind of international-regional mechanisms whereby assurance in supplies and services in nuclear fuel will be provided to States, provided to those governments, those States that had in turn agreed to forego building its own nuclear fuel cycle capacity. In that case, assurances in supply of services takes a form of fuel leasing and fuel take-back offers, and it would have to include effective backup sources of supplies in the event that multilateral nuclear approved suppliers are unable to provide the nuclear fuel material and services. A kind of inter-governmental fuel bank could be established to alleviate unexpected cases, such as excessive shortage of supplies, denial of service for political reasons, and so forth. And IAEA could function as an anchor, a guarantor of the agreement.

So those are the forefront of our discussions. It may not be the best idea. Of course if we could abandon the need for the fissile use of nuclear energy, that is desirable for many societies, but for the reasons I have elaborated at the very first, the top of the page, there is this demand for peaceful use, and how should we relate that problem with this risk of polarization, and how should we deal with these issues under the NPT, because NPT assures us of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. So those are the forefront of issues.

So we are faced with new facts, and all this proliferation concern comes from the terrorist threat or threats from non-actors which States are not used to dealing with. So let us share a few minutes to think, what is the real challenge that we face? Of course we have NPT, we need further nuclear disarmament treaties, but without the kind of points that I intend to make from here-on, all the efforts already said in this statement could be meaningless.

So now let us look into, what is the conflict in wars that we face in the current international community? We have to analyze wars, conflict, the nature of conflict, because armaments are for wars, and unless we can change or understand the nature of wars, we may not be able to have some strong thrust to the future of disarmament. So in my view the nature of conflict changed after the Cold War.

During the 19th century or 20th century and during the Cold War, most of the major wars were fought for political reasons. So if the political leaders have a peace pact, sign a peace pact, the war is finished, terminated, and you will not have killings any more. But after the Cold War we face a kind of a new form of conflict, and I decided to label it as "deep-rooted conflict." And in fact I have given you some of the citation of some most illuminating books that come from, and I take this opportunity to advertise this Stockholm-based inter-governmental organization called the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, and Mayor Akiba was kind enough to mention that democratization is another major pursuit as a political scientist. Now this international IDEA, it is called, is an inter-governmental body that studies democracy and promotes democracy, and they have produced this concept and I am an executive board member of that inter-governmental organization. Now they have produced these reconciliation, deep-rooted conflict concepts. So if anybody is interested in these new concepts beyond disarmament, but they are very deeply associated with disarmament.

Now what is deep-rooted conflict? It is the kind of conflict which goes beyond State, beyond political purposes, and is based on hatred. Now the first split goes, there is a shift in the characteristics of violent conflicts from a traditional inter-State conflict to deep-rooted intra-State or even inter-State conflict, and therefore the reconciliation process along with a peace pact is necessary to deter recurrence of similar conflicts. So they said, if it is a political conflict you have to literally sign a peace pact and the war is finished, but since the nature of the current conflicts around the world are deep-rooted, there is this penetration of hatred in all social cohorts so you need to design a reconciliation process that penetrates all cohorts of the society to finally terminate a conflict in a way that will not recur.

Now the second bullet I have cited from one of the books, deep-rooted conflict. What is it? It combines two powerful elements, important identity-based factors based on

differences in race, religion, culture, language, sometimes it's called a conflict of civilization, with a perceived imbalance in the distribution of economic, political and social resources and opportunities. So there comes the hatred. And traditional approaches all too often fail to address the deep-rooted nature of conflicts and that's the conclusion of peace pacts. It does not necessarily bring human security. With the peace pact you have a national security, but since the deep-rooted nature is not resolved, because there is no process of reconciliation. The United Nations Security Council resolutions will not talk about reconciliation or the process of reconciliation, so it is beyond the scope of addressing the termination role, the need to design a reconciliation process. So this is a vacancy that can be considered to be one of the major reasons why wars recur in post-Cold War years and that they tend to persist, and even if the country is fit to have finished the war, still people suffer immensely from lack of human security and lack of any protection.

So people continue to suffer and die from war-related effects long after the war itself has come to an end, and national security is seemingly restored. And of course terrorism grows on such a deep-rooted sense of hatred. And many people say that poverty is the basis of terrorism. But even more so, hatred is the basis. If you have deep-rooted hate in the community, so they will live on that.

Now there is no clear solution for this, to overcome the conflicts that have this kind of nature. But there is one common denominator, which is deep-rooted hatred in the minds of people. So the reconciliation at all political social levels is the key to ending the violent conflict. And unless you have disarmament, along with the reconciliation process, you will not in the end achieve the difference, which is, that was very important. To make a difference we have to focus on the need for reconciliation.

Now this brings me to the last point which I really wanted to make. Hiroshima is a global model for reconciliation as was pointed out by Ambassador Roche. The first point, the reconciliation as the aftermath of violent conflict is a complex process. In an inclusive process combining the search for truth, justice, forgiveness, healing, reparation and cooperation is the design of the road to a peaceful future. Reconciliation is both the goal and the process to find a way to coexist with former adversaries by sharing a future. So this is the reconciliation process that has to be designed, implemented, has to go into every resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations if it is serious to end the conflict permanently without recurrence.

Now the next bullet is cited from one of the books printed at the bottom. Now this is on the concept of reconciliation because it's very difficult to conceptualize. The word "reconciliation" is a very popular vocabulary, but if you're asked how would you define it, it's very difficult, so to make the job easier for everybody I decided to put this in the slide. Reconciliation is a concept and a pact to refrain the conflict so that the parties are no longer preoccupied with focusing on the issues in a direct cognitive manner. Its primary goal and key contribution is to seek innovative ways to create a time and a place within various levels of the affected population to address, integrate, embrace the painful past, and the necessity for the shared future as a means of dealing with the present. So that's the definition of reconciliation.

And so this brings me to the last point. Hibakusha, the affected, the survivors of the bomb, of the nuclear bomb, is a global model. They have never sought retaliation and

they have embraced reconciliation. So this should be the message from Hiroshima, Nagasaki. But from Japan, generally that in the 21st century, along with the legally binding instrument to enhance nuclear disarmament, we need the process for reconciliation and hibakusha at the core of the nuclear disarmament as the global model.

Even right after the bombing, hibakusha never asked Japan to possess weapons for retaliation, only the complete opposite; they asked that Japan should never have access to it, and that nobody anywhere in the world should go through what they had to go through, so they have embraced this concept of reconciliation. Now I have seen that.

Well, I decided to put in this last page. This was me with Mr. Kofi Annan at the United Nations.

Now the diplomatic negotiations can never fail because if you fail in disarmament negotiations there could be a lot of people killed, so you are facing the great fate of many individuals. So what are the future keys to the success in negotiations? Remembering this page, these are the new elements of the international community. And in order to achieve this, first of all, knowledge-based search for common ground. We have to know, we have to be able to draft the future path and roadmaps, and those who are in the position to accumulate knowledge and share, they have to accumulate knowledge and come out of their offices to share with activists.

The second bullet point is very important: putting survivors first, putting the affected first. Raise your voice. Help them raise their voice. Bring the voice to the conference room so that people will never forget what they have never gone through. And this will help create some common ground for those delegations that are not necessarily convinced or interested in disarmament issues.

But in real negotiations, factoring in domestic context is very important. Many countries, especially big powers such as, of course, the United States, China, big powers, usually take a longer time to convince the domestic audiences and the domestic audience and different government agencies they will spend a lot of time for inter-agency consultations. You have to let them do that. You have to factor that in. And therefore, the roadmap or the process needs to be drawn up with a lot of cautions and extensiveness. So I call it the "enhanced extended process."

Now I said at the outset, we need results-oriented mindset, and I came up with this SOS, so save our ship. And in order to save our ship what we need is a "solution-oriented synergy." In the first place I thought SOA, "solution-oriented action," but then I came to the conclusion that you alone will never be able to achieve anything which could make a real difference. You always have to work in synergies, in a network, in linkages with other organizations, with other interested groups, so you have to develop this synergy, and it was very encouraging to see some synergy developing between nuclear disarmament for, for example, the anti-personnel mines area, and also possibly and hopefully in the small arms and light weapons area, because Mr. Kofi Annan said, small arms are a de facto weapon of mass destruction, 500,000 killed every year, 500,000 people. That means 1,400 a day, and while we sit in this kind of air-conditioned conference room, it's like one person per minute, so

already it's 60 or 70 people have died of small and light weapons. So this is really, really a slow motion weapons of mass destruction or de facto weapons of mass destruction.

And I will add to this comment that the reason why we have never really looked into those conventional weapons areas, and I ask, I plead for the support from the nuclear disarmament community to extend your understanding and support for the conventional weapons disarmament area as well, because the reason why small arms, anti-personnel mines and all that, are left to the sidelines is because, I found the reason why. When I arrived as ambassador I couldn't understand why these exceptionally important issues are not necessarily making progress. But then I understood the reason. It discriminately affects women. Most of the victims are children and women. So the kind of weapons that kill simply women and children are not the priority for disarmament in the current international community. Of the 500,000 victims of small arms and light weapons, 70 per cent are women and children. And this is the picture when I am telling Mr. Kofi Annan that other areas of disarmament, including small arms, needs to be included because of this discriminate nature of victims that arrive in the conventional area.

Now in the end, multi-faceted follow-ups. Well NPT failed but we can send out many other follow-ups and make best use of the limited outcome. Of course the Mayors for Peace activities come really to the forefront. The importance of putting Hiroshima, Nagasaki first, upholding the message. If the States are not doing it, why not the mayor? The Middle Power Initiative. Yes, of course, since the big powers are not doing it, why not the middle powers? So we should go for multi-faceted follow-ups. Please help the Japanese government push for FMCT because FMCT is the top priority for the government, for my government.

Also in the Asia-Pacific we have, we face the threat of proliferation with the DPRK. I was in the Republic of South Korea last month and I called to the East Asian community that since NPT failed, nobody is really making consolidated pressure for DPRK, so DPRK should make an independent non-pressured decision to return to the family of NPT.

So those are the kinds of tricky follow-ups that you could do, well, NPT didn't produce a very high-pressure document condemning the proliferation, condemning DPRK to having non-compliance or to having abandoned the treaty commitment. But since there is no pressure, it is an opportunity for DPRK to independently make its own decisions in return, and I hope that is being done with the Six Party Talks which are taking place even at this particular moment in Beijing.

So thank you very much for putting up with my long talk and I would like to put this on my website also, so if you are interested in looking into these issues, please visit my site. I gave my email address so if you have questions, please contact me. Thank you very much.

PRESIDENT AKIBA: Thank you very much, Prof. Inoguchi. I would like to thank you for speaking for such a long time for all of us on the important issues of diplomacy, especially in the areas of disarmament. It has especially been gratifying that you were able to place the message of hibakusha within the context of the rarefied

work of diplomacy and academia and vice versa. I believe it is important for us to appreciate that because in order for us to mobilize, the majority of the people in the world, it is very important for us to realize that we focus on the common threads that unite, that tie together different groups. Those two groups may not coincide on every point of issue, but we can always find a common thread that ties any two groups together. And that thread will eventually create, piece by piece, a beautiful final product, such as a quilt. If you can envision a quilt which consists of beautiful pieces of cloth and each cloth is independent, they are not completely overlapped, however, they are stitched along a common line and together they form a beautiful and warm quilt. And your presentation this afternoon basically laid out in front of us how we can make that beautiful quilt, which is what we are developing here. So I'd like to thank you again, and please join me with another applause to Prof. Inoguchi.

[*applause*]